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MADDEN V. MIDLAND FUNDING LLC: UPROOTING THE 
NATIONAL BANK ACT’S POWER OF PREEMPTION
ANDREW SILVIA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer lending in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont and the 
securitization thereof may soon deteriorate after the United States Supreme 
Court balked at the chance to uphold more than 150 years of banking law 
precedent. To facilitate an active lending market for consumers, nationally 
chartered banks originate loans and market those loans to investors in the 
secondary marketplace. This allows the bank to liquefy their debts and 
redeploy capital in the form of new loans while remaining within their fed-
erally-mandated capital requirements. The more investors in the secondary 
market and the greater access to those investors that national banks have, 
the more consumers can obtain loans for personal or business use. Unfortu-
nately, the mechanics of this market have frozen up in the wake of the deci-
sion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second 
Circuit”) in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC (“Madden”).1 This decision 
challenges the doctrine of federal preemption of state usury law under the
National Bank Act (“NBA”), which has the potential to significantly dis-
rupt the secondary market and national bank lending.
The Second Circuit held that the interest charged by a national bank at 
a rate up to the bank’s home state usury limit does not preempt another 
state’s usury laws when that loan is sold or assigned, despite the guarantee 
of federal preemption under the NBA.2 Specifically, the Second Circuit 
held that a national bank’s power of preemption did not extend to Midland 
Funding LLC (“Midland Funding”) because Midland Funding is not a na-
tional bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank and, therefore, is 
subject to its home state usury laws on any loans in which it maintains an 
interest.3 This decision uproots decades of legal precedent and industry 
standards that have sustained the doctrine of federal preemption under the 
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
2. Id. at 249.
3. Id.
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NBA. The secondary market depends on federal preemption standards 
when investors purchase loans originated by national banks; and the na-
tional bank depends on these standards to create a liquid market for its loan 
originations. However, with the Second Circuit’s decision in Madden, the 
secondary market has not only frozen up, but secondary market investors 
and loan purchasers that own what they believed to be non-usurious loans 
may now be subject to civil and criminal usury charges. This has created 
urgency and panic throughout the market as indicated by the following 
headlines:
“Peer-to-Peer Lenders Face Legal Blow in Usury Ruling”4; “A New Tar-
iff on ‘Interest-Rate Exports?’”5; “Are Changes Coming To The P2P 
Lending Model?”6; “Is marketplace lending cooling off? Regulatory 
scrutiny impacts alternative lending’s growth”7; “Don’t Let Outdated 
Laws Shackle Credit Innovation”8; “Fitch: Challenges Linger as U.S. 
Marketplace Lending ABS Rises”9; “Moody’s: Federal appeals court rul-
ing on Madden v. Midland is credit negative for marketplace lending 
ABS”10; “Madden v. Midland Has Already Hurt Riskier Borrowers, 
Study Finds”11; “Supreme Court Won’t Hear Madden Case, Leaving 
Unanswered Question about Competing State Laws”12; “Finance Alert: 
The Uncertain Legacy of Madden.”13
4. Matt Scully, Peer-to-Peer Lenders Face Legal Blow in Usury Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-14/peer-to-peer-lenders-losing-court-battle-
over-state-usury-laws.
5. Peter Rudegeair, A New Tariff on ‘Interest-Rate Exports?’, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (June 
30, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/06/30/a-new-tariff-on-interest-rate-exports/.




7. Lisa Valentine, Marketplace Lending Cools Off: Regulatory Scrutiny Is Impacting the Growth 
of Alternative Lending, BANKING EXCHANGE, Oct.–Nov. 2015, at 10.
8. Brian Knight, Don’t Let Outdated Laws Shackle Credit Innovation, AM. BANKER (July 28, 
2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/dont-let-outdated-laws-shackle-credit-innovation-
1075677-1.html.
9. Fitch: Challenges Linger as U.S. Marketplace Lending ABS Rises, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/10/idUSFit93292920150910.
10. Announcement: Moody’s: Federal appeals court ruling on Madden v. Midland is credit 
negative for marketplace lending ABS, MOODY’S (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Federal-appeals-court-ruling-on-Madden-v-Midland-is—
PR_330508.
11. Sean Murray, Madden v Midland Has Already Hurt Riskier Borrowers, Study Finds,
DEBANKED (May 28, 2016), http://debanked.com/2016/05/madden-v-midland-has-already-hurt-riskier-
borrowers-study-finds/.
12. Supreme Court Won’t Hear Madden Case, Leaving Unanswered Question about Competing 
State Laws, ACA INTERNATIONAL (June 29, 2016), http://www.acainternational.org/iap-supreme-court-
wont-hear-madden-case-leaving-unanswered-question-about-competing-state-laws-40090.aspx. 
13. Henry G. Morriello et al., Finance Alert: The Uncertain Legacy of Madden, KAYE SCHOLER 
LLP (June 28, 2016), http://www.kayescholer.com/in-the-market/publications/client_alerts/2016-06-28-
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Indeed, various banking and securities associations have raised serious 
concerns about the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision. Amicus briefs 
were filed with the Second Circuit by the American Bankers Association, 
Independent Community Bankers of America, California Bankers Associa-
tion, Utah Bankers Association,14 the Clearing House Association,15 Secu-
rities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and the Structured 
Finance Industry Group, Inc.16 Conspicuously absent was an amicus brief 
from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)—the federal 
agency that charters and regulates all national banks.17 Although there may 
have been discussions within the OCC to file an amicus brief, for some 
reason, the OCC decided against it. Nevertheless, these organizations have 
raised concerns that the precedential effect of the decision in Madden could
present significant problems for the financial services industry.
The Second Circuit’s holding has influenced decision making not only 
by banks and depository institutions, but also hedge funds, securitization 
vehicles, buyers of defaulted debt, purchasers of whole loans, and other 
purchasers of loans originated by national banks.18 The implications are 
widespread for lenders and borrowers. Indeed, as of March 31, 2015, those 
institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
held over $8 trillion in outstanding loans.19 Because this decision affects 
many key players in the financial services industry, it requires a detailed 
analysis of the Second Circuit’s holding in light of legal precedent and how 
the market should interpret this holding. This note will address the history 
of the NBA and the concept of federal preemption embedded within the 
NBA in Section II, the analysis of the Second Circuit’s decision in Madden 
in Section III, and the implications going forward in Section IV.
finance-alert-the-uncertain-legacy-of-madden/_pdf/Template=pdf/2016-06-28-finance-alert-the-
uncertain-legacy-of-madden.pdf.
14. Brief of the Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Rehear-
ing and Rehearing En Banc, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-
2131) [hereinafter ABA brief].
15. Brief of the Clearing House Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing and Rehear-
ing En Banc, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131).
16. Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Group, Inc., and the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing 
En Banc, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131).
17. See Gen. Docket, Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit at 11, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131).
18. Stephen F.J. Ornstein et al., Second Circuit’s Madden v Midland Decision Could Upend 
Secondary Credit Markets, ALSTON & BIRD (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.alston.com/-
/media/files/insights/publications/2015/09/ifinancial-services—products—financial-services/files/view-
advisory-as-pdf/fileattachment/15135-madden-v-midland.pdf.
19. Brief of the Clearing House Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Re-
hearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 15, at 11.
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Midland Funding moved for a rehearing with the Second Circuit on 
June 19, 2015, but that motion was denied by the Second Circuit on August 
12, 2015.20 Midland Funding filed a petition for certiorari with the United 
States Supreme Court on November 10, 2015.21 Amicus briefs were filed 
with the U.S. Supreme Court by the Clearing House Association LLC, 
ACA International, the Structured Finance Industry Group, and the Ameri-
can Bankers Association.22 The U.S. Solicitor General was also asked to 
submit a brief on behalf of the United States, which was submitted to the 
Court on May 24, 2016.23 The Solicitor General noted that the Second Cir-
cuit erred in holding that state usury laws may validly prohibit a national 
bank’s assignee from enforcing the interest-rate set by the national bank up 
to the level of the state in which it is located.24 However, the Solicitor Gen-
eral argued the Court should deny the petition because there was no split 
among the circuit courts at the time and the Solicitor General believed that 
Midland Funding would prevail on remand after presenting the key aspects 
of the preemption analysis.25
Based on the Solicitor General’s recommendation, the Court denied 
the petition for certiorari on June 27, 2016.26 This surprising move by the 
Court leaves in place the decision of the Second Circuit, which will now 
subject national banks located in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont to a 
different standard than other national banks. For national banks outside the 
Second Circuit’s jurisdiction, the inherent uncertainty of whether or not 
their own courts will make a similar decision has caused them to reevaluate 
their common lending practices. Only time will tell whether courts will 
adopt a similar mandate and disregard the federal preemption right of na-
tional banks or whether the courts will uphold the right of national banks, 
thus creating a split among the jurisdictions. The wait and see approach 
taken by the Solicitor General and the Court will undoubtedly affect the 
lending marketplace for an indefinite period of time.
20. Ornstein et al., supra note 18.
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-
00610).
22. See Court Docket, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610).
23. See Court Docket, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610).
24. Brief of the United States as Amici Curiae at 5–6, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 
S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610) [hereinafter United States brief].
25. United States brief, supra note 24, at 6.
26. See Court Docket, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610).
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II. HISTORY OF THE NBA AND THE VALID-WHEN-MADE DOCTRINE
A. History of the NBA
The NBA, enacted in 1864, created “a federal free banking regime, 
with federally chartered banks issuing a uniform national currency.”27 Even
though the federal government withdrew from the banking system alto-
gether in 1846, the rise of specie currency28 created the need for the U.S. 
Treasury to develop a new national banking system.29 President Abraham 
Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary, Salmon P. Chase, believed that a national 
system would alleviate the problems with specie currency and that by creat-
ing a federal system the majority of state banks would convert to federally 
chartered banks.30 Despite state banks’ reservations that this was evidence 
of an expanding federal state, this proposal was popular with the public 
who viewed a national bank as necessary to finance the Civil War and it 
created assurance that the notes currently in the market were worth what 
they portended to be worth.31 Congress enacted the National Currency Act 
in 1863, which established the national currency of the United States, and 
was subsequently refined in the National Bank Act of 1864. The growth of 
national banks, however, did not come from state banks converting to fed-
erally chartered banks. Most state banks remained state banks and national 
charters were obtained by newly established, or de novo, banks.32
As an incentive for becoming a nationally chartered bank, these new 
national banks were given the benefit of federal preemption to give them an 
advantage over their state competitors.33 Federal preemption under the 
NBA is codified in Title 12 of the United States Code in Section 85, which 
indicates that “[a]ny association may. . .charge on any loan or. . .other evi-
dences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territo-
ry, or District where the bank is located.”34 For purposes of Section 85, a 
national bank is “located in the State named in its organization certifi-
cate.”35 The OCC has promulgated regulations that allow a national bank to 
“make, sell. . .or otherwise deal in loans. . .subject to such 
27. Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Richard Scott Carnell, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION 11 (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2001).
28. Specie currency means a currency that is in coin, as opposed to paper money or soft money.
29. Macey, supra note 27, at 10–11. 
30. Macey, supra note 27.
31. Macey, supra note 27.
32. Macey, supra note 27.
33. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 (1978).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
35. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 310.
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terms. . .prescribed by. . .Federal law,”36 and to make such loans “without 
regard to state law limitations concerning. . .rates of interest.”37 This statu-
tory and regulatory text permits a national bank to export rates that are 
permitted by its home state when dealing with customers from other states, 
even when those rates are higher than the state laws would otherwise per-
mit.38
State usury laws were originally enacted to protect borrowers, particu-
larly individual consumers, from unreasonably high interest rates. Howev-
er, branches and subsidiaries of national banks have traditionally relied on 
the doctrine of federal preemption to avoid the tapestry of state usury laws 
and apply the interest rates otherwise allowed under the NBA.39 Indeed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that this preemption may extend beyond 
national bank entities in certain circumstances where either the entity is 
acting as an equivalent of a national bank with the usual powers or where 
the application of state law would “significantly interfere with a national 
bank’s ability to exercise its power under the NBA.”40 This preemption 
power under the NBA has “been interpreted for over a century to give ‘ad-
vantages to National Banks over their State competitors.’”41
B. Valid When Made Doctrine
While state usury laws vary from state to state, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Nichols v. Fearson suggested that there are two cardinal rules in 
the doctrine of usury: (1) to constitute usury, there must be a loan between 
the parties; and (2) that a contract, which at its inception is not subject to 
usury laws, cannot be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transac-
tions.42 The Court reasoned that if a contract, which is made in a legal and 
non-usurious manner, is sold to another party that would then be subject to 
usury laws and thus render the contract for the loan null and void, then the 
purchaser would have purchased a valueless item and the debtor would be 
discharged of a debt he justly owes to another.43 This produces a senseless 
result. This principle of usury law, often referred to as the Valid-When-
36. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(a) (2014).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d) (2014).
38. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 
15-00610).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2006).
40. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2015).
41. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 (1978) (quoting 
Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1874)).
42. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 109 (1833).
43. Id. at 110 
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Made doctrine, suggests that if the loan is not usurious when it is made, 
then it does not become usurious when it is assigned to another party.44
The Valid-When-Made doctrine was further applied by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1981 when it noted that 
“[t]he non-usurious character of a note should not change when the note 
changes hands.”45 Instead of subjecting every subsequent transaction to 
state usury laws, the courts have interpreted this as an assignment of a right 
whereby “the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, assuming his 
rights as well as his duties. . .whatever the shoe size.”46 The contractual 
right of assignment requires an assignor’s intent to transfer the property or 
instrument, which extinguishes the assignor’s right to performance and 
assigns that power to the assignee.47 This is what happens when a loan is 
sold into the secondary market. The purchaser steps into the shoes of the 
originator of the loan and is given full contractual rights to the loan.
This interpretation of contractual assignment has created another prob-
lem in deciding whether the bank maintains a contractual right or a real 
interest in the loan as the originator, or whether its right is extinguished and 
why that matters for usury laws. Consider that when a bank assigns all its 
rights to a second party, it does not maintain any further interest in the loan 
and the transaction would be considered a typical sale or assignment. This 
sale to the secondary market is what the Second Circuit deemed problemat-
ic in Madden and why the state usury law would apply. However, if the 
bank maintains some interest in the loan, and sells, for instance, only a 
participation interest in the loan, then usury law may not be applied to the 
sale. In Krispin v. May Department Stores in 2000, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue when dealing with an 
assignment of credit card debt from a department store to a subsidiary 
bank.48 The court held that because the bank was the real party in interest 
by setting the terms of the agreement and not the store, the bank was not 
subject to the state usury law where it was not located.49 Because this as-
signment implicated the NBA, the bank was able to maintain the interest 
rights under assignment and exercise its powers as a national bank under 
federal preemption.
44. Ornstein et al., supra note 18, at 1. 
45. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2005).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (WESTLAW 1981).
48. Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 924.
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Whenever a national bank originates a non-usurious loan, the Valid-
When-Made doctrine is implicated and the NBA supports the application of 
federal preemption to the terms of that loan whenever it is sold or assigned. 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that where Congress has not ex-
plicitly granted a power on the states to regulate and limit banking activi-
ties, national banks should not be subject to such limitations.50 Under the 
NBA, national banks have the power to make and sell loans so that they 
may further liquefy their debts and redeploy capital to make additional 
loans.51 Indeed, “[t]he entire secondary market for credit relies on the Val-
id-When-Made doctrine to enforce credit agreements pursuant to their 
terms.”52 The purpose of having a competitive and easily accessible sec-
ondary market is to have the opportunity to make more loans and expand 
the availability of credit, which benefits consumers.53
The ability of national banks to exercise “all such incidental powers as 
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking,”54 as guaranteed in 
the NBA has now come under scrutiny by the Second Circuit in Madden.
This decision has contradicted decades of precedent and seemingly ignored 
the Valid-When-Made doctrine. Interestingly, the Valid-When-Made doc-
trine was not even mentioned in the Madden opinion.55 Because the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied Midland Funding’s petition, the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Madden is the controlling authority within its jurisdiction and it 
has caused uncertainty in the lending marketplace. Current market partici-
pants within the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction are left to analyze the Second 
Circuit’s decision and adjust their lending business to remain in compli-
ance.
III. ANALYSIS OF MADDEN V. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC
A. Facts of the Case
In 2005, the plaintiff, Saliha Madden, opened a credit card account 
with Bank of America, a national bank organized under the laws of the 
state of Delaware and not subject to New York state usury law. Bank of 
America’s credit card program shortly thereafter was consolidated into 
50. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34–35 (1996).
51. ABA brief, supra note 14, at 3.
52. BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, SPECIAL ALERT: SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION THREATENS TO UPSET 
SECONDARY CREDIT MARKETS 3, http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/Special-Alert-re-
Madden-v-Midland_Funding_LLC.pdf.
53. See ABA brief, supra note 14, at 11.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).
55. BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, supra note 52, at 2.
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another national bank, FIA Card Services (“FIA”), which was also orga-
nized under the laws of the state of Delaware.56 By 2008, the plaintiff owed 
$5,000 on her account.57 FIA ultimately wrote off her debt as uncollectable 
and sold the debt to the defendant, Midland Funding, a non-depository debt 
purchaser.58 Midland Funding is not a national bank and neither FIA nor 
Bank of America maintained any participatory interest in the loan after it 
was sold to Midland Funding.59 In November 2010, Midland Funding sent 
a letter to the plaintiff to collect the outstanding debt under the terms of the 
lending agreement, which included an interest rate of twenty-seven percent 
per year,60 a rate that is permissible under Delaware law, but not New York 
law.61
A year later, the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Midland 
Funding alleging that Midland Funding had engaged in abusive and unfair 
debt collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA”).62 Furthermore, and of greater precedential concern for 
national banks, the plaintiff alleged that Midland Funding charged a usuri-
ous rate of interest in violation of New York civil and criminal law, 63
which requires that the interest charged on any loan must not exceed twen-
ty-five percent per year.64 The class to which the plaintiff alleges to be a 
part of includes 49,780 people who received a similar debt collection letter 
from Midland Funding.65
The District Court stated at trial that if the plaintiff could show that 
FIA assigned the debt to Midland Funding, then the plaintiff’s allegations 
would fail because the NBA would preempt any state law usury claim 
against Midland Funding.66 Furthermore, if these facts were proven, then 
the plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA should also fail because the interest 
rates would be permitted.67 The plaintiff confirmed that she received the 
terms of the lending agreement and that the terms were subject to Delaware 
56. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247–48, 250 (2d Cir. 2015).




61. Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 248; Corrected Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 
786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant]; see generally 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e (2006) (“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 
or means in connection with the collection of any debt”).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (CONSOL. 2015); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (CONSOL. 2015).
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (CONSOL. 2015).
65. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 4.
66. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 248.
67. Id.
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law, but the complaint alleged violations of New York usury law, which 
left the plaintiff without a valid claim under New York usury law.68 There-
fore, on May 30, 2014, the parties to the case entered into a Stipulation for 
Entry of Judgment for Defendants for Purpose of Appeal, which stipulated 
that the FIA had assigned the debt to Midland Funding.69 Because this stip-
ulation removed the issues of fact, the District Court granted a final judg-
ment for Midland Funding.70 The Honorable Cathy Seibel of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that “‘as-
signees should be afforded the same protections as those given to the bank 
itself with regard to charging a particular interest rate.’”71
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the court held:
[T]he District Court erred in holding that NBA preemption bars her 
state-law usury claims. . .Because neither defendant is a national bank 
nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on be-
half of a national bank, and because application of the state law on which 
Madden’s claims rely would not significantly interfere with any national 
bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the NBA, we reverse the Dis-
trict Court’s holding that the NBA preempts Madden’s claims and ac-
cordingly vacate the judgment of the District Court.72
The Second Circuit’s reasoning can be broken down into the follow-
ing two principles: (1) Midland Funding is not a national bank, nor a sub-
sidiary or agent of a national bank; and (2) the application of state law in 
this instance would not “significantly interfere” with the national bank’s 
powers under the NBA.73
B. Originator or Possessor: Who is the focus of usury law?
There is no argument that Midland Funding is not a national bank, nor 
a subsidiary or agent thereof; however, that has not traditionally been the 
inquiry when the secondary market considers its legal protections. The 
inquiry is traditionally whether or not the loan was originated by a national 
bank, which is subject to the protections of the NBA and was deemed non-
usurious at the time it was originated.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that there is a universal principle 
that a contract, free from usury laws at its inception, shall not be deemed 
68. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 1, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131) [hereinafter Brief for Defendants-Appellees].
69. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 249.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 68, at 5 (quoting R. on Appeal at A-109).
72. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 249.
73. Id.
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invalid due to any subsequent usurious transaction.74 This is one of the two 
cardinal rules of usury law that has been maintained throughout the history 
of the NBA’s application.75 Despite this cardinal rule, the Second Circuit 
pointed to a bulletin from the OCC that clarified that “third party debt buy-
ers are distinct from agents or subsidiaries of a national bank.”76 The guid-
ance from the OCC is meant to provide advice to banks regarding the risk 
associated with selling loans to third party debt buyers, but this guidance 
focuses more on the reputational, operational, compliance, and strategic 
risks associated with selling loans to third party debt buyers and the way 
those buyers conduct their business, which may have a negative impact on 
the bank.77 Aside from the bulletin advising banks to “comply with appli-
cable laws and regulations,”78 this bulletin falls short of warning banks that 
state usury laws could override the federal preemption status on loans they 
originated. Therefore, even though the Second Circuit and the appellant 
raised the point that third party debt collectors are not operating subsidiar-
ies or bank servicers or agents of a bank and are, therefore, not subject to 
the same regulations as banks are,79 this should be of no consequence re-
garding a loan that was originated by a national bank. However, the Second 
Circuit seems to have adopted the appellant’s position that the extension of 
the NBA’s preemptive powers is proper only when the debt buyer is a sub-
sidiary of the national bank or the national bank retains some interest in the 
accounts.80
The Second Circuit disagreed with the appellee’s reliance on two cas-
es in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where the 
court upheld federal preemption. In Phipps v. FDIC, a bank originated 
loans and then sold those loans to the other defendants in the case for a 
fee.81 The court held that these fees were properly considered interest under 
the NBA and concluded that the court “must look at ‘the originating entity 
(the bank), and not the ongoing assignee . . . in determining whether the 
NBA applies.’”82 The Second Circuit, however, stated that Phipps was
74. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 106 (1833).
75. Id. at 109.
76. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 250.
77. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-37, CONSUMER 
DEBT SALES (Aug. 4, 2014).
78. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-37, CONSUMER 
DEBT SALES (Aug. 4, 2014). 
79. See Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 251–52; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62,
at 19.
80. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 11.
81. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005).
82. Id. at 1013 (quoting Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000)).
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distinguishable from Madden because Madden involves interest charged 
after the account was sold by FIA to Midland Funding.83 Would the court 
be more inclined to accept the guiding principle in Phipps if the appellant 
in Madden had raised this issue when Bank of America sold the loan to 
FIA? If we were to accept the Second Circuit’s interpretation, we would 
never know at what point during the origination and assignment of the loan 
that the loan would become usurious.
The appellant argued that the point at which a rate of interest is usuri-
ous should be when the rate is actually charged against the customer, rather 
than when the loan is made.84 This standard would thus focus more on the 
conduct of the non-bank assignee rather than the national bank that origi-
nated the non-usurious loan under the NBA.85 This cannot be relied upon 
as precedent. This standard would produce even more confusing results 
because the precedent of the application of the NBA in the courts would be 
completely overturned to accommodate a statutory interpretation that 
would go against Congressional intent.86 If the Second Circuit had applied 
the NBA as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had 
applied it in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Lattimore Land 
Corporation, then “[t]he non-usurious character of a note should not 
change when the note changes hands.”87
While the Solicitor General agreed with this principal in its brief to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, they noted that the court in Lattimore dealt with a set 
of facts dissimilar to the ones in Madden and, therefore, the court’s opinion 
in Lattimore would not constitute a split between the Fifth Circuit and the 
Second Circuit.88 However, the government’s unwillingness to 
acknowledge any split among circuit courts, regardless of how shallow the 
circuit split may be, should be swamped by the sheer importance of the 
question presented and errors in applying the principle of the NBA by the 
Second Circuit.89
The second case the Second Circuit dismissed was the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Krispin v. May De-
partment Stores in 2000. In Krispin, a department store issued credit cards 
to customers with late fees and delinquency rates subject to Missouri state 
83. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 253.
84. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 15.
85. Id. at 35.
86. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
87. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. United States brief, supra note 24, at 17.
89. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 786 F.3d 246 
(2d Cir. 2015) (No. 15-00610).
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usury laws.90 Those delinquent rates were charged off by the department 
store to the May National Bank of Arizona—a national bank and wholly 
owned subsidiary of May Department Stores—with delinquency limits as 
allowed under Arizona state law.91 The store had assigned all of its interest 
in the credit card accounts to the bank.92 The court agreed with the store 
that the store was acting as an assignee and the real interest in the credit 
card accounts was transferred to the bank.93 Therefore, the court held that 
the agreement between the store and the bank effectuated an assignment of 
a contractual right and the bank, under the NBA, was allowed to charge up 
to the state usury rate of the state where it was located.94 The bank then 
changed the interest rate on the credit card agreements, notified the cus-
tomers of the change, and later re-assigned the accounts back to the store.95
In determining the application of the NBA, the court in Krispin fo-
cused on the originating entity that set the terms of the contract by stating 
that “the store’s purchase of the bank’s receivables does not diminish the 
fact that it is now the bank, and not the store, that. . .sets such terms as in-
terest and late fees.”96 Thus, per the court’s reasoning, the entity that sets 
the contractual terms maintains an interest in the accounts.97 In Madden,
the contractual terms, including a twenty-seven percent interest rate, were 
set by a national bank acting under the guarantees of the NBA and Dela-
ware law.98
The appellant in Madden argued that the circumstances in Krispin
were different because in Krispin not only were the banks and the subsidi-
aries related by corporate structure, but also the bank in Krispin had main-
tained some interest in the debt.99 The appellant also argued that other 
courts have limited the application of the NBA in cases of assignment to 
only those circumstances where the national bank, as had been done in 
Krispin, maintained “some ongoing, legally cognizable interest” in the 
transferred accounts or where the national bank is “legally or operationally 
related to the assignor.”100 The difference between the appellee’s assertion 
that an interest remains when the non-bank entity is enforcing terms origi-
90. Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 921–22 (8th Cir. 2000).
91. Id. at 921.
92. Id. at 922.
93. Id. at 923.
94. Id. at 924.
95. Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 68, at 11.
96. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d at 924.
97. Id. 
98. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015).
99. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 26.
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interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers as protected by the 
NBA.
C. Do State Usury Laws “Significantly Interfere” with a National 
Bank’s Powers?
A national bank’s ability to make and sell loans has been a fundamen-
tal focus of banking to facilitate market demand for loans as well as to 
price for and spread the risk that any one of the possible loans enters de-
fault. The Second Circuit seems to misinterpret, or worse, misunderstand 
the intent of “significantly interfere.” The appellant noted that because the 
differences between the NBA and the state usury laws raise a conflict 
preemption issue, the only way that the federal law may preempt the state 
law is when the two laws are incompatible or the state law significantly 
impairs the federal law.108 This is the basis for the question of whether or 
not application of state law “significantly interferes” with the NBA’s grant 
of rights and duties to the bank. If the application of the state usury law 
would significantly interfere with the national bank’s powers then the state 
law will be preempted.109 However, the determination that a state regula-
tion significantly interferes with a federal power is an affirmative defense 
and it places the burden of proof on the defendant, or Midland Funding in 
this case.110
The Second Circuit stated, “[Midland Funding] did not act on behalf 
of [Bank of America] or FIA in attempting to collect on Madden’s debt. 
The defendants acted solely on their own behalves, as the owners of the 
debt.”111 The appellant in Madden relied on this distinction and pointed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson 
that stated the NBA sets forth the limits on national banks, but says nothing 
about non-bank entities.112 However, even though Midland Funding was 
not acting as a subsidiary or agent of the bank in collecting on the debt it 
purchased, the U.S. Supreme Court has also suggested that the federal 
preemption provision of the NBA may extend beyond the national bank 
itself so long as the non-national bank entity is acting as the “equivalent to 
108. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 13–14.
109. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005).
110. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 14; Zink v. First Niagara Bank, N.A., 18 
F.Supp.3d 363, 367 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
111. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).
112. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 15; Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 
U.S. 1, 9 (2003).
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national banks with respect to powers exercised under federal law.”113 This 
preemption protection is meant to provide the non-national bank entity the 
ability to act as the national bank so that the national bank’s abilities are 
not inhibited by state laws restricting the entity’s actions.
At least one practical benefit to this right of preemption is that, as was 
done by Bank of America, national banks often assign their debt collections 
to third parties to outsource this branch of their business so it can focus on 
its mandate to offer credit to consumers. This not only benefits the banks, 
but also benefits the lending market because outsourcing facilitates special-
ization and specialization facilitates efficiency.114
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Olvera 
v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C. expanded on this premise in determining whether or 
not an assignee of a debt could charge the same interest that a licensed loan 
originator could charge even though the rate was higher than the state usury 
laws allowed.115 The assignee was a debt collection agency that specialized 
in collecting bad debts.116 The court held that the debt collection agency 
was able to charge the higher rate because the common law of assignment 
allows the assignee to step into the shoes of the assignor.117 The court stat-
ed that holding an assignee liable to the state usury rate would “be to make 
the credit market operate less efficiently,” which the court was reluctant to 
adopt.118
Indeed, the Second Circuit noted that it is possible that usury laws 
would negatively impact the market for these loans by reducing the interest 
rate banks would be able to charge on these loans, but the Second Circuit 
swiftly dismissed these ramifications by stating that the effect would not 
significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers.119 The 
Second Circuit was concerned that “extending [NBA] protections to third 
parties would create an end-run around usury laws.”120 Therefore, the court 
was more concerned with the policy implications of extending this preemp-
tion rather than protecting the bank’s exercise of “all such incidental pow-
113. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 250 (quoting Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 
1, 18 (2007)).
114. Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2005).
115. Id. at 286–87.
116. Id. at 286.
117. Id. at 288–89.
118. Id. at 288.
119. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).
120. Id. at 252.
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ers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.”121 This im-
plication goes against the Congressional intent of the NBA.122
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank N.A. v. Nelson that the 
NBA, a federal statute, explicitly grants a national bank authorization, per-
mission, or power with no indication that Congress intended the national 
bank to be subject to local restrictions.123 The Court further explained that 
normally Congress would not want the States to forbid or impair signifi-
cantly the exercise of a right that Congress explicitly granted.124 Because 
the state law may significantly interfere with a national bank’s exercise of 
its powers even if it does so indirectly, the level of interference that gives 
rise to preemption is “not very high.”125
However, the Second Circuit seems to have decided that states can 
limit this exercise of power whenever a national bank relinquishes an inter-
est in the loan and that this practice does not significantly interfere with the 
national bank’s powers. The Second Circuit stated that subjecting third 
party debt purchaser activities to state usury laws would not “significantly 
interfere” with loan sales by banks.126 But the court disregards the market-
ability of those types of loans compared to loans sold by state chartered 
banks specifically subject to state usury laws.
Perhaps the Second Circuit’s decision was motivated by an elevation 
of consumer protection standards over the established authorities of nation-
al banks. If so, the Second Circuit’s policy implications are misguided. 
Consumer protection is clearly a significant concern for the court, especial-
ly in enforcing the FDCPA,127 but these third-party purchasers do not offer 
credit to consumers, nor do they set the terms of the agreements.128 If the 
debtors agree to the terms of the loan with the originator (i.e. the national 
bank), then the debtor should be held to those agreed upon terms of such 
contracts, regardless of whether or not the debt is, or may be, assigned to 
another party. The debtor could hardly believe that the interest rates would 
121. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).
122. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
123. Id. at 34–35.
124. Id. at 33.
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-
00610) (quoting Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2009)).
126. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).
127. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692(e) (Lexis 2016) (“It is the purpose of this title to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from 
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent 
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).
128. Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2005).
670 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:2
plummet if the contract exchanged hands.129 If consumer protection were to 
be raised to the level of the Second Circuit’s opinion, then national banks 
would likely simply stop making these loans to high-risk debtors, so that 
they could minimize their lending risk.
Fewer banks would be willing to offer loans to customers within the 
New York area because the loans could not be resold at the competitive 
rate of interest and, therefore, would be kept on the bank’s balance sheets 
or sold with an uncompetitive interest rate. A requirement to maintain the 
loans on the national bank’s accounts implicates national bank capital re-
quirements, which require the bank to maintain certain levels of liquidity in 
accordance with the assets and liabilities held by the bank. The ability to 
sell off defaulting or troublesome loans allows the bank the ability to re-
main within its capital requirements and to lend to more individuals.
Furthermore, there is a concern over the impact to credit risk now that 
the bank is liable for collecting these outstanding debts. The risk of default-
ing on a loan is now something that could directly impact the liquidity and 
other financials of the bank. Banks often use the secondary market to adjust 
risk exposures. Where loans have already defaulted, the bank can sell off 
the loan to the secondary market quickly and balance its risk; however, 
with the precedent set in Madden, the bank’s ability to manage its risk in 
case of default presents another concern for the regulators.130
Although the Second Circuit may be trying to protect consumers from 
usurious interest rates, the court has presented a new problem: lack of 
available credit. This policy choice would, in fact, significantly interfere 
with a national bank’s power by forcing them to comply with individual 
state usury laws and then be forced to only sell that loan to that state or 
another state with similar usury rates. The national banks would be forced 
to either reduce the amount it charges on its interest—an action the Second 
Circuit stated would not significantly interfere with the bank’s powers131—
or make fewer loans above the state usury rates, which would significantly 
disrupt the national market. Either way, this decision significantly inter-
feres with the national bank’s powers entrusted to it by Congress.
129. Id.
130. See ABA brief, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
131. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 251.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD
A. Impact on the Banks
The court’s decision in Madden chills the secondary market and goes 
directly against Congressional intent to allow banks to liquefy their debt 
and make new loans to new consumers.132 The Second Circuit did address 
some concern that usury laws may prevent banks from carrying out their 
lending powers,133 but the court stated that the usury laws would not “sig-
nificantly interfere” with the powers of the national banks.134 However, if a 
bank cannot sell a loan according to its terms without being subject to crim-
inal usury penalties then the usury laws have significantly interfered with 
the powers of national banks. Indeed, a potential debt-buyer could be sub-
ject to criminal usury laws in New York if that person “knowingly charg-
es . . . at a rate exceeding 25% per annum.”135 The looming threat of 
criminal charges has halted the purchase of these loans until the doctrine of 
federal preemption has been reviewed and some certainty is granted.
The appellant in Madden argued that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) had attempted to nar-
row the scope of national bank’s powers by adding Section 25(b) into Title 
12 of the United States Code, which outlines the specific preemption stand-
ards.136 These standards again include the significantly interfere test set out 
in Barnett Bank and considers any discriminatory effects on national 
banks.137 The appellant states that “Congress had expressed concern that, 
through its excessively broad preemption positions, the OCC had ‘actively 
created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish 
without State controls.’”138 And, indeed, Dodd-Frank did authorize states to 
bring lawsuits against national banks for violating the NBA and restricted 
the federal preemption of national banks to only state consumer finance 
laws that regulate financial accounts.139 However, nowhere in Section 25(b) 
132. ABA brief, supra note 14, at 3.
133. See Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 251.
134. ABA brief, supra note 14, at 6 (quoting Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 251).
135. N.Y. PENAL § 190.40 (CONSOL. 2015).
136. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1) (2006).
137. Id.
138. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 39 (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 17 (2010)).
139. JOSEPH L. BARLOON ET AL., BANK PREEMPTION AFTER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 4 (Sept 13, 
2010), 
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Bank_Preemption_After_the_Dodd_Frank_A
ct_0.pdf; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044, 
124 Stat. 1376, 2014-17 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2010)).
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This uncertainty and risk will be gobbled up by the shadow banking 
market. Shadow banks are non-bank financial institutions, including bro-
ker-dealers, mortgage finance firms, asset-backed commercial paper con-
duits and money market mutual funds, that offer loans to individual and 
institutional borrowers.147 Shadow banks often offer higher returns for 
high-risk loans. Even though there is a market and purpose for these shad-
ow banks, consumer lending may not yet be the best place for them. The 
concern is that whereas traditional banks are regulated by the OCC, the 
FDIC, and the Federal Reserve System, these shadow banks offering high-
risk loans do not have such clear regulatory demarcations. Therefore, the 
growth of the shadow banking market in this area may increase the risk to 
the whole economy. The years leading up to the 2007–2009 financial crisis 
in the United States were characterized by the development of a new set of 
financial institutions that formed the so-called shadow banking system.148
“In fact, the rise in defaults among subprime lenders triggered runs in dif-
ferent shadow banking markets, causing the collapse of most of these un-
regulated institutions and also affecting the traditional banking system.”149
In 2013, the Financial Stability Board estimated the total assets of the 
shadow banking market at $75 trillion, $5 trillion more than the previous 
year.150 Given the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision, shadow banks 
may offer opportunities for consumers who are turned away from tradition-
al banks. This increase in shadow bank lending could destabilize the econ-
omy and impact this high-risk lending market in a way the Second Circuit 
did not consider.
History has already proven that improper regulation of the secondary 
market can create unwarranted friction in the lending market. In 2002, the 
state of Georgia passed a statute that imposed unrestricted liability for as-
signees of certain higher-cost mortgages for any claim that could be assert-
ed against the originator.151 In response, the rating agencies decided not to 
rate the securities that were backed by mortgage loans that were originated 
in Georgia.152 The ill effects of the statute simply removed the evaluation 
that the ratings agencies provided on the securities and, therefore, left the 
147. Francesco Ferrante, A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow 
Banking System, 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 
2015-21, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015021pap.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1–2.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Brief of The Clearinghouse Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 21, Midland Funding, 
LLC v. Madden, No. 15-00610.
152. Id. 
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investors without any idea of what they were investing in.153 The ultimate 
effect was that the financial institutions refused to buy mortgages that orig-
inated in Georgia and the lenders withdrew or limited their operations in 
the state until, ultimately, Georgia was forced to amend the statute to limit 
assignee liability.154
C. Solutions
The overall uncertainty of this litigation has concerned not only banks 
and other depository institutions, but also hedge funds, securitization vehi-
cles, buyers of defaulted debt, purchasers of whole loans, and those who 
purchase loans originated by banks, especially those who are now in pos-
session of usurious loans. Two options moving forward include having the 
originating bank maintain an interest in the loan or amending the current 
agreements to comply with individual state usury laws.155
As determined in Krispin, if the bank maintains an interest in the loan, 
the loan may be protected by the NBA and not deemed usurious.156 The 
dueling precedential definitions of “interest” are at odds though, which 
creates uncertainty as to whether the bank maintains an interest. On one 
end, the bank may be required to maintain a “legally cognizable inter-
est,”157 and on the other end the interest is automatically maintained 
throughout the life of the loan because it is the bank that “sets such terms as 
interest and late fees.”158 The latter definition would continue to favor na-
tional banks federal preemption power while the former definition would 
cause banks to maintain these loans on their books either in whole or in 
part.
Indeed, Lending Club, the largest marketplace lending platform in the 
United States, altered its operations after the Second Circuit’s decision. 
Lending Club stated that it incorporated a new “enhanced program struc-
ture” whereby the bank will maintain an ongoing economic interest in any 
loan that it originates and sells to the secondary market until the borrowers 
make all the payments on the loan. This transition by one of the biggest 
153. Id.
154. Id. at 22.
155. PAUL HASTINGS, MADDEN V MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC: POTENTIALLY FAR-REACHING 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-BANK ASSIGNEES OF BANK-ORIGINATED LOANS 3 (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/stay-current-madden-v-midland-
funding34064e66923346428811cff00004cbded.pdf.
156. Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000).
157. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 5.
158. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d at 924.
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marketplace lending platforms may lead to accounting issues for the bank 
that now must maintain the loan on its balance sheet.159
The industry has also been advised by law firms to review its loan 
portfolios for any loans within the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction, including 
the financial capital of the United States, New York, and to understand the 
potential civil and criminal penalties they may be exposed to because of the 
now usurious nature of their loans.160 They may need to renegotiate the 
terms of the loans and bring the loan’s interest rates under the state usury 
requirement or just maintain those loans on its books and make fewer 
loans. However, problems lie at the heart of both solutions. Litigation from 
plaintiffs’ attorneys may run rampant because of this decision and it may 
require loans under the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction to be amended to 
comply with state usury laws, thereby increasing the risk to national banks. 
As in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, increased risk to high risk 
debtors could lead to higher speculation and overall uncertainty in the mar-
ketplace.
Additionally, forcing banks to maintain the loans on their balance 
sheet would decrease the ability of banks to lend to creditworthy borrowers 
because increases in capital requirements have set higher standards to en-
sure a bank’s liquidity. For example, in July of 2015, the Federal Reserve 
approved a new rule that took effect on January 1, 2016 and forces eight 
major banks to “hold additional capital to increase its resiliency in light of 
the greater threat it poses to the financial stability of the United States.”161
This rule forces these banks to “either hold substantially more capital, re-
ducing the likelihood that they will fail, or . . . shrink their systemic foot-
print.”162 This rule was made in continuance of Dodd-Frank’s requirements 
for minimum risk-based capital reserves for those insured depository insti-
tutions.163 Because banks must remain in compliance with these require-
ments, a national bank’s abilities would be limited in the amount of lending 
they could undertake if they had to maintain such loans on their balance 
sheets.
159. JD Alois, Lending Club Reacts to Concerns Over Madden vs. Midland Decision,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/02/82246-lending-club-
reacts-to-concerns-over-madden-vs-midland-decision/.
160. See Ornstein et al., supra note 18, at 3.
161. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board approves 
final rule to hold additional capital to increase its resiliency (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150720a.htm.
162. Id. 
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
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To avoid this downfall and mitigate economic risk, federal preemption 
under the NBA should remain in full force. Hopefully, other courts will 
appropriately examine the congressional intent behind Section 85 of Title 
12 of the United States Code and the Second Circuit will uphold that intent 
in the future. Until the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a split among the 
jurisdictions, we are left to reorganize a standard practice that is 150 years 
old.

